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Abstract
We test the hypothesis that consumption smoothing occurs after large, but not small, 
expected future income shocks. Even though this hypothesis has often been discussed,
formal evidence in support of it is rare. We use individual level, monthly, bank account 
data to examine how expected income shocks from final mortgage payments impact
credit card consumption, and the repayment of credit card debt. Our data allows us to 
identify the exact magnitude and date of final mortgage payments, and also to exploit the 
random timing of these expected income shocks across individuals. Our results are 
consistent with the magnitude hypothesis. 5
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
  
  The Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) predicts that individuals 
should smooth consumption over time if future income shocks are predictable. For 
example, if an individual knew with certainty that she would receive $1000 in 6 months 
time, the PIH predicts that she should borrow today and then pay off this debt when she 
receives the predictable income shock in the future. This is so she can smooth 
consumption both before as well as after the date she receives the income shock. 
However, even though the PIH is central to much of modern consumption theory, and in 
spite of a very large number of empirical studies on consumption smoothing
1 , no 
consensus has emerged on whether consumption smoothing does or does not hold 
empirically. It remains a major outstanding puzzle to explain why consumption 
smoothing is sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected by the data.  
  A variety of authors (e.g. Kreinin, 1961, Souleles, 1999, Browning and Collado, 
2001, Hsieh, 2003, Coulibaly and Li, 2006, Stephens, 2008) have suggested that one 
possible solution to this puzzle involves the magnitude of the predictable income shock. 
This argument (which we term the “magnitude hypothesis”) states that consumption 
smoothing will hold if the size of the predictable income shock is large enough, but will 
not hold if the predictable income shock is small. One popular explanation for the 
magnitude hypothesis is bounded rationality. Browning and Collado (2001) argue that 
individuals “do smooth (consumption) …if there are large and predictable income 
changes” (p. 682) but that they “will not bother to adjust optimally to small income 
changes since the utility cost of doing so is small” (p. 690). Similarly, Hsieh (2003) 
summarizes the bounded rationality argument by noting that there may be “costs 
associated with the mental processing of these forecastable income changes” (p. 404).   
To extend our example above, if the amount of the future income shock was small 
(say $100), then the magnitude hypothesis suggests that the individual may “not bother” 
                                                 
1 A large literature has attempted to test this hypothesis by examining individual level consumption patterns 
following various predictable income shocks. Examples of this literature include (Agarwal, Liu, & 
Souleles, 2007; Bodkin, 1959; Browning & Collado, 2001; Coulibaly & Li, 2006; Hsieh, 2003; Johnson, 
Parker, & Souleles, 2006; Kreinin, 1961; Musto & Souleles, 2006; Parker, 1999; Shapiro & Slemrod, 1995; 
Shapiro & Slemrod, 2003; Shea, 1995; Souleles, 1999; Souleles, 2000; Souleles, 2002; Stephens, 2001; 
Stephens, 2003; Stephens, 2006; Stephens, 2008). 
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to arrange the credit needed to smooth consumption, or to engage in the “mental 
processing” needed to work out her optimal consumption patterns. On the other hand, if 
the magnitude of the future income shock was large (say $5000), then the magnitude 
hypothesis suggests that the individual is much more likely to smooth consumption by 
making use of credit and working out her optimal stream of consumption over time.     
  Table 1 provides a summary of some of the literature testing the PIH using 
identifiable income shocks. This Table shows that there is little consensus among those 
papers that have addressed the magnitude hypothesis (Panel A of Table 1). On the one 
hand, a group of recent papers that discuss the magnitude hypothesis, such as Browning 
and Collado, (2001), Hsieh, (2003) and Coulibaly and Li, (2006), do not formally test this 
hypothesis (e.g. by comparing large and small shocks). Rather, these authors suggest that 
their results may be consistent with the magnitude hypothesis, because the PIH tends to 
hold following income shocks that can be considered “large”. On the other hand, the two 
papers (Kreinin, (1961) and Souleles (1999)), that have both formally tested the 
magnitude hypothesis (by comparing large and small shocks), both reject the hypothesis. 
However, as we argue in Section 2 below, both these papers use data that is subject to 
various data concerns. In other words, even though much recent discussion has focused 
on the magnitude hypothesis as a possible explanation for why the PIH may hold (e.g. 
Browning and Collado, (2001), Hsieh, (2003) and Coulibaly and Li, (2006)), those papers 
who have formally tested it (e.g. by comparing large and small shocks) have not found 
evidence to support it (Kreinin, (1961) and Souleles (1999)). The aim of our paper is to 
address these conflicting elements in the literature, by providing a new test of the 
magnitude hypothesis using a high quality new database. 
Our data consists of a confidential individual level database provided by a 
Canadian bank. The data consists of monthly statement data for approximately 20 000 
individuals for both their credit card as well as their mortgage accounts, over 19 months. 
We follow Coulibaly and Li (2006) and Stephens (2008) in arguing that the final payment 
of a long term debt contract can be analyzed as an expected disposable income shock. 
Our aim is to examine how credit card usage is impacted by the expected disposable 
income shock of a final mortgage payment. We measure the expected disposable income 
shock using our mortgage data, and we measure the individual’s consumption and debt 7
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response using our credit card data. Our main test of the magnitude hypothesis examines 
if consumption and debt responses are different for individuals with high compared to 
low expected disposable income shocks (i.e. the cessation of high versus low monthly 
mortgage payments).  
Our use of monthly credit card data to examine issues around consumption 
smoothing follows a variety of recent papers including Gross and Souleles (2002a) and 
Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007) etc. We believe that our data set is unique, however, 
because our monthly credit card data is matched to monthly mortgage balance data. 
Because of this, we are able to exploit the wide variance in the magnitude of final 
mortgage payments over individuals, in order to test how the magnitude of an expected 
disposable income shock (the final mortgage payment) impacts credit card consumption 
and debt. 
There are two main advantages in using this database and research design to test 
the magnitude hypothesis. First, because we have monthly data on each individual’s 
mortgage balance as it declines towards zero, we are able to isolate exactly which month 
a mortgage holder finally pays off their mortgage as well as the exact amount of the 
monthly payments. In other words we have a remarkably precise measure of both the 
timing and magnitude of each individual’s expected future income shock as measured by 
the final monthly mortgage payment. This differs from those papers in the literature (see 
Table 1) that have identified either the timing or magnitude of  income shocks using 
survey based databases (such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) or the Survey 
of Consumer Finance (SCF)), which are subject to various well known measurement 
issues inherent in the use of survey based data.  
Second, we exploit the fact that the dates of final mortgage payments are 
randomly distributed across individuals over time. In this regard, our use of final 
mortgage payments as an expected income shock differs from examining government 
payments (e.g. tax rebate payments or fiscal stimulus payments) which have been 
extensively examined in the consumption smoothing literature (see Table 1). As 
highlighted by Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007), government payments of various kinds 
tend to be clustered for all individuals in a few months of the year, thus it may be difficult 
to disentangle whether each individual’s consumption on that date is responding to that 8
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specific government payment, or to any other macroeconomic factor that occurred at the 
same time, e.g. stock exchange or monetary policy developments. In our research design, 
we are able to exploit the random distribution of the date of the final mortgage payment 
across individuals to identify exactly when specific individuals received this disposable 
income shock relative to all other individuals in our sample. Furthermore, we are able to 
use our data to only include instances where the date of an individual’s final mortgage 
payment is predetermined, an important element of identification in our tests.   
Section 2 of the paper examines the contribution of our paper relative to the 
existing literature, while Section 3 details the data we use. Section 4 describes the 
methodology and Section 5 provides results.  
 
2.  RELATIONSHIP TO THE  LITERATURE 
 
As described above, there is disagreement in the literature about the relevance of 
the magnitude hypothesis. On the one hand, a group of recent papers (e.g. Hsieh (2003) 
Browing and Collado (2001) and Coulibali and Li (2006)) speculate that the magnitude 
hypothesis is one possible reason for consumption smoothing, following income shocks 
that these authors consider to be “large”. However, none of these papers formally 
compare large and small shocks. On the other hand, Kreinin (1961), and Souleles (1999), 
both reject the magnitude hypothesis by examining individual consumption across a large 
number of individuals, after each received the same type of income shock but where there 
is a wide variance in the magnitude of these shocks across individuals. Kreinin (1961) 
examines Israeli reparations payments using the Israeli Survey of Family Savings, and 
Souleles (1999) examines tax rebates using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). 
Both these authors distinguish between large and small shocks by squaring the income 
shock term, and both reject the magnitude hypothesis because the income shock squared 
term is insignificant.  
Our study follows the approach of Kreinin (1961) and Souleles (1999) in 
examining a single type of income shock (final mortgage payments), where there is a 
wide variance in the magnitudes of the shocks across individuals. However, we argue that 
the data used by these authors is subject to important data concerns. Firstly, both authors 9
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use survey based data, and as argued by Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal, Liu 
and Souleles (2007) etc., such surveys are subject to significantly greater measurement 
problems compared to the monthly bank statement data that we use. Second, as 
emphasized by Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007), a key element of testing consumption 
smoothing across individuals is that the date of the expected income shock be 
randomized across individuals. However, the data used by both Kreinin (1961) and 
Souleles (1999) to test the magnitude hypothesis does not allow for such randomization 
of timing. Our data and research methodology allow us to specifically account for both 
the measurement accuracy as well as the randomized timing issues.  
In terms of theoretical explanations for the magnitude hypothesis, at least three 
separate behavioral theories have been proposed in the literature to explain why 
magnitudes may matter.  These are (1) bounded rationality (e.g. Kreinin, 1961, Browning 
and Collado (2001) and Hsieh (2003)), (2) mental accounting (e.g Souleles (1999) 
following (Thaler, 1990)) and (3) inattention (e.g. Coulibali and Li (2006) following 
(Reis, 2006)). Bounded rationality, is based on the argument that individuals will not 
make optimal intertemporal adjustments to consumption if the amount of the future 
income shock is too small, because of the mental costs involved. The mental accounting 
argument is based on the idea that if individuals receive a large income shock they will 
choose to save it, but if they receive a small income shock they will choose to consumer 
it. Inattention, is based on the argument that individuals will be more attentive to larger 
shocks. The literature has not, however, been able to provide empirical evidence to 
distinguish between these three theories. The aim of this paper is to document empirically 
whether magnitudes do impact consumption smoothing decisions. As in the literature, 
however, our data does not allow us to distinguish empirically between the various 
behavioral theories (e.g. bounded rationality, mental accounting, inattention etc). 
 
3.  DATA  
 
3.1 Individual Level Monthly Bank Account Data  
Our main database consists of individual level monthly credit card and mortgage 
statements provided to us confidentially by an individual Canadian bank. While a number 10
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of recent papers have used monthly credit card statement data
2, our data is unique in that 
it is matched with monthly mortgage account data.  Because of the variance in the size of 
final mortgage payments across individuals, we are thus able to provide the first formal 
test of the magnitude hypothesis using individual level monthly bank statement data. We 
use credit card statement data to measure credit card consumption and credit card debt, 
and monthly mortgage statements to measure predictable income shocks. Our primary 
focus is on the approximately 20 000 individuals who hold both mortgage as well as 
credit card accounts at the bank. Our dependent variables are individual level credit card 
behavior (the dollar value of either credit card consumption or the change in credit card 
debt), and our independent variables are contemporaneous and lagged values of the dollar 
magnitude of the expected disposable income shock (i.e. final mortgage payments).  
The Bank that provided us with their credit card data is a full service retail bank 
that provides a full set of financial services to its clients, including investments, 
mortgages, credit cards and deposit and checking accounts. The bank has not targeted any 
particular consumer segment, but like most Canadian banks is active across all consumer 
segments. It is active in both consumer and business banking. The bank is a very well 
established and has been active for many decades. For confidentiality reasons we are not 
able to provide any more information about the characteristics of the bank. The period of 
our data runs from December 2004 to June 2006. This was a period of rapid economic 
growth in Canada. Like most other Canadian banks, this bank was able to deal with the 
financial turbulence of 2008 without any official assistance, partly because the provision 
of sub-prime mortgages was extremely rare in Canada.   
As described by Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal, Liu and Souleles 
(2007), the use of monthly credit card data to examine consumption smoothing provides a 
number of important advantages in terms of measurement accuracy, over survey type 
data (such as CEX or SCF). However, as noted by Gross and Souleles (2002a) and 
Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007), the unit of analysis in monthly credit card statement 
data is the account holder and not necessarily the individual, because the individual can 
                                                 
2 A variety of papers have also used individual level credit card monthly statement data to examine a 
variety of issues. These papers include (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, & Souleles, 2006; Agarwal et al., 
2007; Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson, 2008; Gross & Souleles, 2002a; Gross & Souleles, 2002b; 
Musto & Souleles, 2006). 11
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hold multiple credit card accounts. In this regard we follow the strategies used by Gross 
and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007), by firstly, only including 
“active” credit cards in our analysis (i.e. cards for which there is regular monthly 
activity), and secondly, including FICO scores as a control variable (which measures 
credit quality across all sources of credit and not just the credit card in our study).  
Furthermore, we argue that our study has one important additional advantage over 
existing studies in this regard, because the credit cards used in our study are, by 
definition, all attached to individual mortgage accounts at the same bank. We argue that 
because of “relationship lending” or “product bundling”, individuals will often receive 
greater benefits in using a credit card that is issued by the same bank that sells them other 
consumer finance products (such as mortgages etc). For this reason, individuals may have 
a strong incentive to use the credit card in our study (which is attached to their mortgage 
account), rather than other credit cards they may own issued by other financial 
institutions
3.   
 
3.2. Census Data on Income – Testing the Relative Magnitude Hypothesis 
Our main hypothesis of interest in this paper is that the magnitude of an expected 
income shock impacts the consumption or debt response of individuals. In the existing 
literature on the magnitude hypothesis, however, it is unclear whether consumers respond 
to the absolute magnitude of the expected income shock, or the relative magnitude of the 
income shock – that is the size of the expected income shock relative to total income. Our 
strategy in this paper is to empirically examine both the absolute as well as relative 
magnitude hypotheses.  
Our monthly bank statement data described above does not include a direct 
measure of the individual’s income. However, the bank account data does include the 
Canadian Postal Code for each individual. This Postal Code data allows us to match our 
bank account data with Canadian Census data, which provides disaggregate data on a 
variety of demographic variables including income, at the Postal Code level. In other 
words, this procedure allows us to measure the postal code level income for each 
                                                 
3 This is borne out by our discussions with managers of our data providing bank, who indicated that 
individuals with strong relationships with the bank (i.e. mortgage holders) are indeed more likely to receive 
“preferential treatment” in their credit card accounts, relative to individuals who do not hold a mortgage.   12
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individual in our data. By dividing the amount of the final mortgage payment by the 
postal code level measure of individual income, we can measure the relative magnitude 
of the expected income shock.  
Appendix 1 describes in detail the procedures used to match these databases, 
while Table 2 provides detailed summary statistics of all variables used in our analysis. 
As described in Appendix 1, each Canadian postal code area contains an average of 20 
households. However, in order to match these with census data we are required to use a 
geographic measure called a Dissemination Area (or DA), which is an agglomeration of 
approximately 10 neighbouring postal codes with an average of approximately 200 
households. In this paper we use the terms dissemination area (DA) or “postal code” 
interchangeably to refer to a DA area of 200 households. It is important to emphasise that 
the size of this Canadian post code area (200 households) is orders of magnitude smaller 
than US Zip codes, thus providing us with very fine grained measures of income etc. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section we first describe our baseline tests of consumption smoothing (i.e. 
ignoring issues of magnitude). We then describe how we test the absolute as well as the 
relative versions of the magnitude hypothesis.    
 
4.1. Baseline Test of Consumption Smoothing  
  Consumption smoothing with anticipated shocks implies two empirically testable 
hypotheses. First, if an individual has smoothed consumption, then there should be no 
significant difference in consumption on the date of the receipt of the expected income 
shock relative to consumption on other dates. Second, consumption smoothing implies 
that the individual accesses credit in advance of the expected future income shock, and 
then pays down that credit after the income shock has been received. In order to test these 
hypotheses we estimate the following models. Model (1) examines the impact of the final 
mortgage payment on credit card consumption (CONS); while model (2) examines the 
impact of the final mortgage payment on the change in credit card debt (ΔDEBT).  13
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In these two equations, the key variable of interest is FINAL, which captures the 
exact month and exact dollar magnitude of the final mortgage payment of an individual’s 
mortgage contract. The vast majority of data points in the FINAL variables are zero, 
except for the month t of the final mortgage payment for individual i, in which case the 
variable includes the dollar magnitude of the final payment. Those individuals, for whom 
FINAL is zero, act as a control group. Equations (1) and (2) also include a number of 
other control variables (Z) which we describe in detail below, as well as month fixed 
effects (time) and individual fixed effects (CustID). Following (Petersen, 2008) all our 
panel data results use clustered robust standard errors.  
The structure and interpretation of these models is very similar to those used by 
Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007), whose data has a very 
similar structure to ours (i.e. monthly individual bank accounts). Following Gross and 
Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal et al (2007) equation (2) uses the change in credit card 
debt rather than the level of credit card debt as the dependent variable. These authors 
argue that while consumption is a flow variable, debt is a stock variable, thus it is more 
appropriate to examine the change in debt. Furthermore, we closely follow the event 
study interpretation of these models used by Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal, 
Liu and Souleles (2007) in that the individual’s consumption or debt in the period(s) after 
FINAL are being compared to the period(s) before FINAL.  
  Each of these equations provides a test of consumption smoothing. First, 
consumption smoothing implies that the F coefficients in equation (1) are insignificant 
because the expected income shock following the final mortgage payment should not 
have a significant impact on monthly consumption relative to other months.  Secondly, if 
an individual pays down his/her credit card debt in the month(s) after the final mortgage 
payment, as predicted by credit smoothing, then we would expect negative E coefficients 
in equation (2). The distributed lags on FINAL in equations (1) and (2) can be interpreted 14
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as in event studies. For example, in the case of the consumption equation (1), the 
coefficient F0 measures the instantaneous response of consumption and the marginal 
coefficients F1,   F2,  F3 etc measure the additional response of consumption in the 
months after the final mortgage payment. We can thus measure the cumulative (or long 
term) response of consumption to the final mortgage payment by examining 6F summed 
over multiple lagged months. Similarly, in equation (2) we can also measure the 
instantaneous, marginal and cumulative impacts of final mortgage payment on the change 
in the level of credit card debt, by examining E0, the individual lagged Es as well as the 
cumulative measure 6E summed over multiple lagged months.  
The cumulative measures of the impact of FINAL are of particular interest, 
because the income shock we are considering (the final mortgage payment) can be 
considered as a permanent increase in the individual’s disposable income. Once the 
individual has finished paying their final mortgage payment, the individual receives a 
permanent increase in disposable income each month into the future. For this reason we 
focus on the cumulative measures (i.e. the sum of all lags).    
   Both of the dependent variables in equations (1) and (2) as well as the main 
independent variable of interest (FINAL) in these equations are measured in dollars. Thus 
the coefficients on FINAL from these equations are direct measures of the impact that 
FINAL has on either consumption or the change in credit card debt. This is different from 
some of the consumption smoothing literature which has only been able to measure 
future income shocks as a dummy variable.  
      
4.2. Ensuring the timing of FINAL is Predetermined 
  An important issue in testing consumption smoothing is that the timing of 
predictable future income shock needs to be exogenous (e.g. a shock that emanates from 
the government or an employer) or predetermined (e.g. where the individual does not 
control the timing of the shock).  If, however, the individual is able to determine the 
timing of when she receives the income shock, then the income shock is endogenous, and 
equations (1) and (2) above are no longer valid. In this paper we are able to utelise the 
data that we have to ensure that we only examine final mortgage payments that are 
predetermined, and we exclude all data where the date of the final mortgage payment is 15
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endogenously determined by the individual. Stephens (2008) followed a very similar 
strategy in his car loan consumption smoothing study by excluding all individuals who 
paid off their car loans before the final due date. He comments that “this exclusion is very 
important for the identification strategy as it restricts the analysis to those loan 
repayments …that are predetermined” (p. 244). 
  Based on discussions with the bank, we define two separate types of mortgage 
payers, based on the pattern of their final months of mortgage payments. We label these 
two groups “amortizers” and “lump-sum payers”.  The “amortizers” are individuals who 
have worked out with the bank a steady stream of equal mortgage payments (including 
interest and capital) which continues until the final payment. We argue that individuals, 
who choose this amortization approach to the stream of mortgage payments, know in 
advance the exact magnitude of their final mortgage payment as well as the exact month 
of their final mortgage payment. Econometrically speaking, the final mortgage payment 
can then be considered predetermined to these individuals.  
  On the other hand, the bank informed us that certain mortgage holders have the 
right to pre-pay their mortgage by certain amounts (typically a function of the opening 
balance of the mortgage). For example, consider an individual who makes regular 
mortgage payments of $500, but then makes a final payment of $10 000 to pay off the 
mortgage in full. It would clearly be inappropriate in the context of testing consumption 
smoothing to define such a “lump-sum payer” as somebody who has made a 
predetermined final mortgage payment.  
Similarly, it would also be inappropriate to include individuals who have 
defaulted or who are delinquent on their mortgages in our FINAL group. Our data allows 
us to observe such individuals and exclude them. If for any reason the outstanding 
mortgage balance increases (or stays constant) between any two months, that individual 
is not included in our FINAL group. 
  Because of the exact nature of our monthly payment data, we are able to identify 
very precisely the “amortizers” in our data who have paid off the mortgage in full.  
Specifically, the criteria we use to include an individual in our FINAL group is that the 
outstanding mortgage balance must decline in equal monthly increments (which we 
define as within 10%) over time until it reaches zero.  We only use data if at least four 16
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previous months of data are available before the mortgage balance reaches zero. Based on 
these characteristics, we are able to identify 147 individuals in our sample who made 
final mortgage payments that were predetermined. The dollar magnitudes of these final 
payments are included in our FINAL variable. As a comparison, Coulibali and Li (2006) 
identify 286 individuals who have paid off their mortgages (in one year of data), out of 
their total sample of 39515 mortgage holders. 
 
4.3. Tests of the Absolute Magnitude Hypothesis 
Once we have specified the standard consumption smoothing models in equations 
(1) and (2), it is possible to adapt these specifications in order to test the main hypothesis 
of this paper – the magnitude hypothesis. This section examines the absolute magnitude 
hypothesis, i.e. that the magnitude of FINAL impacts consumption smoothing. The 
following section examines the relative magnitude hypothesis, i.e. where FINAL is 
divided by income.  
  In order to test the magnitude hypothesis we utilize two different specifications to 
differentiate between “large” and “small” final mortgage payments (FINAL). Our first 
specification is simply to divide the FINAL measures into large and small categories 
based on whether they are above or below the mean value of FINAL (i.e. $751). We refer 
to those expected income shocks that are greater than $751 as FINAL_HI , and those 
expected income shocks that are smaller than $751 as FINAL_LO. We then modify our 
baseline equations 1 and 2 above to run separate equations for large shocks and for small 
shocks. Equations 3 and 4 are modified forms of equation 1 and provide the 
specifications for the credit card consumption models. 





it t i s it s it it
s
CONS time CustID FINAL HI Z DD F G H 
 
     ¦  





it t i s it s it it
s
CONS time CustID FINAL LO Z DD F G H 
 
     ¦  
 
  The magnitude hypothesis predicts that consumption smoothing should hold if 
FINAL is large. Thus the magnitude hypothesis predicts that the F
HI coefficients in 
equation (3) should be insignificant, because smoothed consumption would not be 
significantly different in the periods before and after FINAL. The magnitude hypothesis 17
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also predicts that consumption would respond if the magnitude of FINAL was small, thus 
the F
LO coefficients in equation (4) should be significant and positive.   
  One possible concern with specifications (3) and (4) is that the difference between 
large and small that we chose (i.e. the mean level of FINAL across individuals) may not 
be the actual turning point. Our second approach to testing the magnitude hypothesis does 
not predetermine the turning point. This second specification formulates the magnitude 
hypothesis as an “inverted U” specification, and thus includes square terms in the model. 
The standard way of modeling such an “inverted U” specification is to include squared 
terms for FINAL (i.e. FINAL_SQ) in addition to the level terms.  
(5)




it t i n it n m it m it it
ss
CONS time CustID FINAL FINAL SQ Z DD F F G H 
  
      ¦¦  
  An inverted U specification implies that the FINAL coefficients in (5) are 
significantly positive and the FINAL_SQ coefficients in (5) are significantly negative.  
  Our specifications to examine the impact of the magnitude of FINAL on the 
change in credit card debt, are very similar to those used above to examine the magnitude 
of FINAL on credit card consumption. Our first specification is to examine the impact of 
FINAL_HI and FINAL_LO (as defined in equations (3) and (4) above) when the 
dependent variable is change in credit card debt, rather than credit card consumption. 
This results in equations (6) and (7).   





it t i s it s it it
s
DEBT time CustID FINAL HI Z DD E G H 
 
'      ¦  





it t i s it s it it
s
DEBT time CustID FINAL LO Z DD E G H 
 
'      ¦  
   As above, the magnitude hypothesis implies that individuals will smooth 
consumption when FINAL is large. This implies that the individual should use the 
expected increase in disposable income (after the final mortgage payment) to pay down 
existing credit card debt (i.e. E
HI in equation (6) would be negative and significant) rather 
than to increase consumption (F
HI in (3) is insignificant).  On the other hand, if the 
individual did not smooth consumption (as the magnitude hypothesis predicts for small 
magnitudes of the final mortgage payment) then the individual could use the increase in 18
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disposable income to increase consumption (i.e. F
LO in (4) is significant and positive), but 
not to pay down their credit card debt (i.e. E
LO in (7) is insignificant).   
    As in the case of the consumption equations we specify quadratic equation 
(8) as an alternative test of the magnitude hypothesis (6) and (7). The only difference 
between (8) and (5) is that the dependent variable is the change in debt rather than the 
level of consumption.   
     (8)




it t i n it n m it m it it
ss
DEBT time CustID FINAL FINAL SQ Z DD E E G H 
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  As described for the case of equation (5) above, equation (8) allows us to examine 
if an “inverted U” specification applies to the change in debt. If the coefficients on the 
FINAL_SQ term are significant and negative, then this implies as that as the magnitude 
of FINAL gets larger, so there will be an increasing rate of the reduction of credit card 
debt as predicted by the magnitude hypothesis. 
 
4.4. Test of the Relative Magnitude Hypothesis 
The tests conducted in equations (1) to (8) above all have as the independent 
variable of interest FINAL, which examines the absolute impact that the final mortgage 
payment has on consumption or credit card debt. In this section we test the hypothesis 
that the relative size of final (relative to income) will impact the response of consumption 
and debt. Existing discussions of the magnitude hypothesis in the literature (see Table 1) 
state that the magnitude of the shock should impact the response of consumption and 
debt, but do not specify whether this magnitude is in absolute terms or relative to income.  
In this paper, therefore, we conduct tests for both the absolute as well as relative 
specifications.  
Essentially our tests of the relative magnitude hypothesis are similar to our tests 
of the absolute magnitude hypothesis in equations (1) to (8) above with the one exception 
that in each case the variable FINAL (or FINAL_HI or FINAL_LO) is replaced by 
FINAL/INC, where FINAL is divided by the postal code level income variable for each 
individual in the sample. Our measure of income is taken from the Statistics Canada 19
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Census database which provides postal code level measures of income. Full details of the 
use of this data are provided in the data appendix below.  
 
4.5.Control Variables (Z) 
  In all of the models we add various control variables specified as Z in the 
equations above. In our results section below we report results that both include and don’t 
include these control variables. Our first control variable is the credit utilization rate – i.e. 
the ratio of the individual’s credit card debt outstanding relative to their credit card credit 
limit for each month. An individual whose credit utilization rate is relatively high (i.e. 
their level of debt is high relative to their credit card credit limit) may make different 
consumption and debt repayment decisions relative to an individual whose credit 
utilization ratio is low.  Including the credit card credit utilization rate allows us to 
control for this. Our second control variable is the log of the individuals credit card credit 
limit. The credit card credit limit is set by the bank for each individual, and changes 
periodically. Once again we include this variable to control against the possibility that the 
credit card credit limit could impact individual consumption and debt repayment 
decisions. Our third control variable is the FICO score for each individual. The FICO 
score is an external measure provided by a credit rating agency and captures past credit 
behavior by the individual across all credit products. This variable thus allows us to 
examine how credit behavior in other credit products besides the credit card in our study 
impact credit card consumption and debt decisions.  Our final control variable is a 
measure of Age taken from post code level census data. A large literature has examined 
the impact of age on individual consumption and debt behavior in the context of 
consumption smoothing etc, thus it is appropriate to include age as a control variable in 
our tests.    
 
4.6. Excluding Alternative Explanations – Credit Constraints 
  While the main focus of this paper is on testing the magnitude hypothesis, as is 
evident from Table 1, a large proportion of the consumption smoothing literature has 
rejected consumption smoothing because of credit constraints. A key assumption of the 
PIH is that the individual has access to credit in order to borrow in advance of the future 20
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certain income shock, and thus smooth consumption. Therefore consumption smoothing 
may not occur because of credit constraints. Thus before we can conclude that 
consumption smoothing is a result of the magnitude hypothesis, it is necessary to ensure 
that our results are not being driven by the alternative hypothesis of credit constraints. 
   Our data allows us to rigorously exclude those individuals who may be credit 
constrained. Following Gross and Souleles (2002a), we can define individuals who are 
credit constrained if their credit card utilization ratio (i.e. monthly credit card debt 
divided by their credit limit) is greater than 90%. All individuals who are credit 
constrained are excluded from our FINAL group. It is not surprising that the number of 
individuals excluded from FINAL because of credit constraints is very small
4. Given that 
the individuals in this group have access to at least two sources of credit, (mortgage and 
credit card) and furthermore have just paid off their mortgage, it does not seem likely that 
many in the FINAL group will be credit constrained. By excluding these (relatively few) 
credit constrained individuals, we are able to focus only on the magnitude hypothesis as 
an explanation for the lack of consumption smoothing.  
 
4.7. Selection Bias  
An important issue in tests such as ours, which examine the behavior of some 
individuals (i.e. those who receive the “treatment” of a final mortgage payment) relative 
to a “control group” (all other mortgage payers), is whether there is any selection bias in 
the choice of those specific individuals into the FINAL group. We argue that selection 
into the FINAL group should not generate selection bias. Every individual in our sample 
is both a credit card as well as a mortgage holder.  The only systematic difference 
between the individuals in our FINAL group and all the other individuals in our control 
group is the fact that these individuals are making their final mortgage payment, while 
the others continue to pay their mortgages (those who prepay or who default are 
excluded). In due course every mortgage holder will come to the end of the mortgage 
contract.  
                                                 
4 Between 6 and 8 individuals who have just made their final mortgage payment also have a credit card 
utilization rate of above 90% (depending on whether the utilization rate is measured over a single month or 
averaged over multiple months).  21
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  It may be possible that individuals in our FINAL group are older on average than 
all other individuals who are still paying their mortgage. However, as described above, 
we control for this by including Age as a control variable in all our tests. Furthermore, the 
date of the final mortgage payment will be randomly determined, based on issues such as 
the starting date of the contract and the amount of monthly payments. 
An alternative selection issue could occur if individuals select into FINAL_HI or 
FINAL_LO groups for some systematic reason. We discuss this issue in more detail, as 




5.1 Absolute Magnitude Hypothesis 
Our results for the Absolute Magnitude hypothesis are presented in Tables 3, 4 
and 5.  Following Agarwal et al, (2008) and Gross and Souleles, (2002a), we report both 
marginal coefficients for each lag as well as the cumulative (or long run) coefficient 
which shows the significance of the sum of all lags from 0 to n. Because the income 
shock we are examining (final mortgage payments) is a permanent rather than temporary 
shock, we are specifically interested in the significance of the long run cumulative 
coefficient (i.e. the sum of all lags).   
Tables 3 and 4 can be considered together. Table 3 includes three specifications 
for credit card consumption; the baseline case where the FINAL variable is included 
without any differentiation between large or small magnitudes, as well as the separate 
cases of large final mortgage payments and small final mortgage payments. Table 4 
examines the same three specifications for the change in credit card debt. Table 3 (final 
row) shows that the cumulative FINAL coefficient for the impact of small final mortgage 
payments on consumption is significant and positive, while the cumulative coefficient for 
large final mortgage payments is insignificant. On the other hand, Table 4 (final row) 
shows that the cumulative FINAL coefficient for the impact of large final mortgage 
payments of the change in card debt is significant and negative, while the cumulative 
coefficient for small final mortgage payments is insignificant.  22
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These results are consistent with the magnitude hypothesis. Individuals with large 
final mortgage payments do not have significantly higher consumption after the final 
mortgage payment, but they do significantly reduce their credit card debt – actions that 
are consistent with consumption smoothing. On the other hand, individuals with small 
final mortgage payments do have significantly higher consumption, but do not 
significantly lower their debt – actions which are not consistent with consumption 
smoothing. Thus as predicted by the magnitude hypothesis, the evidence in Tables 3 and 
4 is consistent with consumption smoothing for larger rather than small expected 
permanent income shocks.   
The importance of taking into account the magnitude of expected income shocks 
can be seen by examining the baseline specifications in Tables 3 and 4, where all final 
mortgage payments are included irrespective of magnitude. In the case of both the 
baseline consumption models as well as the baseline debt models, all estimates of 
cumulative FINAL coefficients are insignificant. In other words, without taking 
magnitudes into account, the erroneous conclusion could have been reached that FINAL 
mortgage payments have no significant permanent impact on either credit card 
consumption or credit card debt. It is only by distinguishing between large and small 
magnitudes that we can conclude that consumption smoothing occurs for large but not 
small income shocks, as predicted by the magnitude hypothesis. 
The magnitudes of the significant cumulative coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 are 
also of interest (recall that the consumption and debt variables as well as the FINAL 
variable are all measures in dollars). In Table 3 the significant cumulative FINAL_LO 
consumption coefficient for small final mortgage payments is 2.18 (or 2.48 with 
controls). This implies that, if the final mortgage payment is small, the cumulative 
increase in credit card consumption for the 8 months after the final mortgage payment 
will be 2.18 (or 2.48) times the magnitude of the monthly mortgage payment.  Similarly, 
in Table 4, the significant cumulative FINAL_HI debt coefficient is -0.76 (without 
controls) and -0.72 (with controls). This implies that if that final mortgage payment is 
large, cumulative change in credit card debt in the 8 months after the final mortgage 
payment will be -0.76 (or -0.72 with controls) times the magnitude of the final mortgage 
payment,.    23
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Table 5 reports results for the quadratic specification. In the case of credit card 
consumption we find that the cumulative FINAL variable is positive and significant and 
the cumulative FINAL_SQ variable is negative and significant.  In other words, our 
results support the hypothesis of an inverted U shaped relationship between consumption 
and the magnitude of FINAL. This specification is consistent with the magnitude 
hypothesis that as the size of the expected income shock increases beyond a certain point, 
so the impact of that shock on consumption will be reduced. Similar findings are apparent 
in the debt quadratic equation, which shows that the cumulative term for the FINAL_SQ 
coefficients is negative and significant. In other words, as the magnitude of FINAL 
increases so there is a larger negative impact on the cumulative change in debt 
outstanding.     
 
5.2. Relative Magnitude Hypothesis 
The results for the relative magnitude hypothesis (where all the FINAL 
coefficients are divided by income) are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8.  The results for the 
HI and LO equations in Tables 6 and 7 are weaker than those reported above in the case 
of the absolute magnitude hypothesis, with no cumulative FINAL/INC coefficients 
significant in Tables 6 and 7. However the results reported in the quadratic specifications 
in Table 8 are relatively strong, and are consistent with the magnitude hypothesis. In 
particular, Table 8 shows that in both the case of consumption and the change in debt, the 
cumulative coefficients are significant for both the level and square terms. In both cases 
the results suggest an inverted U relationship for consumption and the change in debt as 
the size of FINAL/INC increases. These results are consistent with the magnitude 
hypothesis that at low levels of FINAL/INC, consumption and the change in debt may 
increase, but at high levels of FINAL/INC, debt will decrease, along with consumption. 
In other words, even after we divide the magnitude of FINAL by income, we still find 
support for the magnitude hypothesis in the quadratic specification.   
 
5.3. Robustness Tests 
  We replicate our results above using a variety of robustness tests. First we 
experiment with different lag lengths on the FINAL variables. Our results are robust to 24
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different lag lengths. As described by various authors who use similar types of data, we 
face a trade-off in determining the lag length, because the greater the lag length the 
greater the number of individuals that will be excluded because monthly various data 
points are missing from the dataset. Our lag lengths are similar to those used in the 
existing literature. Second, instead of using as our control group the 20 000 individuals in 
our sample who have both a credit card as well as an outstanding mortgage, we extend 
the control group to include all 75 000 individuals in our sample who have a credit card 
account, irrespective of whether or not they hold a mortgage. Our main results are robust 
to this change in control group.  
 
5.4.  The Characteristics of HI and LO Mortgage Payers  
Finally, we use our data to examine if there are systematic differences between 
mortgage payers in the FINAL_HI and FINAL_LO groups. As described above, if there 
is a systematic reason for why individuals sort into HI and LO groups, then this could 
cause selection bias, which could impact the interpretation of our results.  
The amount of a monthly mortgage payment is a function of a variety of factors 
including total mortgage size, type of interest rate, and amortization period chosen. Thus, 
it can be argued that there are a number of alternative reasons why some individuals may 
pick a low monthly mortgage payment and others may pick a high monthly mortgage 
payment. For example, lower income individuals, whose total mortgage debt may be 
lower, may have a lower monthly mortgage payment. Alternatively, higher income 
individuals, even with a larger total mortgage debt, may also choose a lower monthly 
mortgage payment (using a longer amortization period) in order to build up an investment 
portfolio in other assets
5.  Thus theoretically, it can be argued that there is not a single 
determinant (e.g. income) of individuals choosing higher or lower monthly payments. 
Rather, we argue that the magnitude of the monthly mortgage payment is a function of a 
large number of factors including but not limited to income, the size of the mortgage as 
well as the overall investment goals and priorities of each individual. 
                                                 
5 In the Canadian banking system, borrowers typically have the choice of changing the amortization period 
of the mortgage by changing the magnitude of the monthly payment. 25
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  We can also examine this empirically by using our available census and bank 
account data to conduct difference in mean t tests to examine if there are differences in 
the high and low groups. We conduct these tests for both the absolute magnitude 
(FINAL_HI and FINAL_LO) groups as well as the relative magnitude groups 
(FINAL/INCOME_HI and FINAL/INCOME_LO).  These results are reported in Table 9. 
Using postcode level census data, we are able to compare these individuals both in terms 
of total income, but also in terms of the proportion of total income from investments, as 
well as the proportion of total income from government sources (e.g. government 
pensions and unemployment insurance). We find that for both the absolute and relative 
models, individuals who choose low monthly mortgage payments have higher investment 
income – consistent with the argument that some individuals may choose to invest in 
other assets rather than rapidly paying down their mortgages. On the other hand we also 
show that individuals with lower total income, greater percentage of income from 
government sources and lower FICO scores have lower monthly mortgage payments. In 
other words, this data shows that there does not seem to be a single systematic reason for 
which individuals choose high or low monthly mortgage payments.  
 
 6. CONCLUSION 
 
  The Permanent Income Hypothesis is central to much modern economics, 
including consumption and saving theory and many macroeconomic models. Despite its 
importance, empirical evidence on the hypothesis remains unsettled. One possible 
explanation for why the PIH only sometimes holds is the magnitude hypothesis, which 
states that consumption smoothing occurs after large but not small expected future 
income shocks. While a variety of papers have discussed the magnitude hypothesis, those 
few papers that have formally tested it by comparing large and small income shocks have 
rejected the hypothesis.  
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new test of the magnitude 
hypothesis, using a high quality new dataset that addresses some of the data concerns in 
the previous literature. We examine the impact of a single kind of income shock (final 
mortgage payments) where there is a wide variance in the magnitude of these shocks 26
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across individuals. We use a confidential database consisting of monthly bank credit card 
and mortgage statements for about 20 000 individuals over 19 months, provided to us by 
a Canadian bank. This data is able to provide an exact measure of both the timing as well 
as the magnitude of the final mortgage payment. Furthermore, our data exploits the fact 
that the timing of the final mortgage payment is randomly distributed across individuals.  
Our data is unique in that monthly mortgage account data is matched with 
monthly credit card statement data, thus we can test the magnitude hypothesis by 
examining the impact of final mortgage payments on credit card consumption and debt. 
We test both the absolute magnitude hypothesis as well as the relative magnitude 
hypothesis (where the size of the expected shock is divided by income).  
Our results show that if the magnitude of the final mortgage payment is small, 
then the final payment is followed by a significant increase in credit card consumption 
but not a significant reduction in credit card debt. On the other hand, if the magnitude of 
the final mortgage payment is large, then the final payment is followed by a significant 
reduction in credit card debt, but not a significant increase in consumption. In other 
words, our result are consistent with consumption smoothing occurring when expected 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs  Median  Mean  Std Dev 
 
A: Individual Level Monthly Bank Balance Sheet Data 
 
 
1: Credit Card Data 
 
       
Credit Card Debt ($ /month)  1496451  681.38  2050.73  3497.93 
Credit Card Consumption ($ /month)  1496451  151.99  577.34  1865.78 
Card Debt/Limit (%)  1494969  25.76  38.28  39.38 
Credit Card Credit Limit ($)  1496451  5000.00  6147.33  6271.31 
FICO Score  1399828  741  723.78  100.13 
         
 
2: Mortgage Data 
 
       
Monthly Reduction in Mrtg Balance ($)  255249  800.00  950.22  887.36 
 FINAL (Final Predetermined  Monthly 
Mortgage Payment) ($) 
 
147  627.01  751.46  507.93 
FINAL/INCOME (Final Predetermined 
Monthly Mortgage Payment/ Total 
Annual Income) 
142  0.0281  0.0331  0.021 
 
B: Post Code Level Census Data (Matched to Credit Card Data) 
 
Total Annual Income ($)  1460288  21626.00  22221.38  7651.05 
Income from Invest & Bus (%  of total)  1458721  7.6  8.46  5.47 
Income from Govt Sources (% of total)  1460288  10.8  11.83  7.47 
Age   1462827  41.23  41.11  5.88 29
ECB
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TABLE 9: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW MORTGAGE PAYERS
T tests of Differences in Mean
Panel A: Absolute Magnitudes
FINAL_LO FINAL_HI
t test of Diff in 
Mean
Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
Bank Account Data (Individual)
Credit Card Debt/Limit (%) 32.38 3.48 28.4 3.93 0.739
FICO Score 742.97 7.95 765.48 5.44 2.05**
Census Data (Post Code Level)
Invest & Bus Income (% of total income) 8.08 0.46 6.46 0.54 3.05***
Govt Transfer Payments (% of total income) 12.59 0.7 9.83 0.95 2.35**
Total Income (C$) 21245 701.51 23976 1030.45 2.26**
Panel B: Relative Magnitudes
FINAL/INCOME_LO FINAL/INCOME_HI
t test of Diff in 
Mean
Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
Bank Account Data (Individual)
Credit Card Balance/Limit (%) 33.02 4.15 30.27 3.58 0.5
FICO Score 737.04 9.69 766.28 5.48 2.65***
Census Data (Post Code Level)
Invest & Bus Income (% of total income) 8.71 0.53 6.68 0.43 2.94***
Govt Transfer Payments (% of total income) 11.48 0.62 12.2 0.94 0.62
Total Income (C$) 23698 820.25 22233 641.79 1.41
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels36
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Appendix 1: Postal Code Level Census Data  
Our main database is the confidential data on individual credit card and deposit accounts. 
An important advantage of this database is that it includes the Canadian postal code for 
each individual. We use the postal code to match our data on credit card mistakes with 
postal code level census data provided by Statistics Canada. The Statistics Canada 
Census data provides us with various proxies for different components of income. In 
order to match the two databases based on postal codes we follow the procedures adopted 
by Statistics Canada and Canada Post by using a concept known as the Dissemination 
Area (DA) as the minimum geographic area into which we can place all of our various 
data. A DA consists of a number of neighboring postal codes. In terms of size, the 
average Canadian Postal Code has approximately 20 households, while the average 
Dissemination Areas (DAs) has 200 households. For ease of understanding, in other 
sections of this paper we refer to both “postal code” as well as “DA” interchangeably to 
refer to the Dissemination Area (with 200 households on average). We are able to 
uniquely convert each postal code into each DA using the Postal Code Conversion File 
(PCCF) published by Statistics Canada and Canada Post (Statistics Canada, March 2006). 
Even though each Canadian DA has more households (200 households) than an 
individual Canadian postal code (20 households), it is still orders of magnitude smaller 
than each US Zip Code (approx 10 000 people). A full description of the geographic 
concept of the Dissemination Area is provided by Statistics Canada, (2001). The 
geographic concept of the DA has been designed by Statistics Canada as a relatively 
stable geographic unit composed of one or more neighbouring blocks, with a population 
of 400 to 700 persons (or on average 200 households). A DA can be formed within 
another DA when the population of an apartment or townhouse complexes meets or 
exceeds 300 persons (or as little as 125 households). DAs are defined by Statistics 
Canada to have intuitive (or visible) boundaries, such as roads or selected geographic 
features (such as rivers etc). (Statistics Canada 2001). A key issue concerns the 
homogeneity of individual households within a DA (i.e. same type of people). According 
to Statistics Canada, the homogeneity of each DA follows from the fact that “dwelling 
type often tends to be consistent from block to block without sudden transitions” 
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